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This article does not concern what might be termed ‘the religious side of
religion’ (each of us has written about that elsewhere3). Both of us are very sym-
pathetic to true religion; to what we call faith as practice; to a genuinely spiritual
orientation toward life. One of us, Rupert Read, is a Quaker and a Buddhist
meditator. The other, Nassim Taleb, comes from a Levantine Greek Orthodox
family and, growing up in Lebanon, studied the Quran and other religious texts
(Old Testament, Talmud) to practice Semitic languages; he has embraced Greek
Orthodoxy as a repository of ancient Mediterranean lore and rites, focusing on
the practice aspect (which includes religious fasts and feasts and a focus on the
ceremonial), rather than the belief side. A victim of the Lebanese war, he is fully
aware of the destructive effects of religious intolerance.
So to the question posed in the Prologue to this symposium (Klein 2014),
“Does professional economics needs enrichment by religious or quasi-religious
thinking?,” our answer is squarely “yes,” as we believe that religion has traditionally
performed a powerful risk-management function at the level of the individual and
the collectivity, particularly in preventing the accumulation of debt in systems and
in preventing some kinds of experimentation with natural systems, ones that
produce errors with irreversible effects. We argue that religion transmits heuristics
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of risk control across generations, and that religion does so in modes that only it
can.4
Figure 1. Rare or ‘tail’ events tend to not show in (recent) past samples. Yet they are terribly
consequential. Religion helps with intergenerational memory by carrying a certain class of
interdicts.
Let us start by presenting the problem of silent risk, as seen in Figure 1, a class
of severe exposures—‘Black Swans’—that are so infrequent as to not necessarily
show in past samples. Yet these are terribly consequential and determine a large
share of the statistical properties. Perhaps one cannot explain their ‘causes’ except
after the fact, and perhaps not even then. If we look at asset prices, we find a large
share of rare events without predecessors. Black Swans are often brushed aside
with assurances to the effect of ‘it never happened before’ or ‘times are different.’
Evidentiary or statistical methods fail us there. Such methods consist in
looking at the properties of past data and reacting based on recent ‘evidence.’ But
4. These heuristics belong to the class called “convex heuristics,” mathematically defined in Taleb (2014).
Their aim is not to be ‘right’ and avoid errors, but to ensure that errors remain small. A convex heuristic
has the following properties: (1) Compactness: It is easy to remember, implement, use, and transmit. (2)
Consequences, not truth: It is about what it helps you do, not whether it is true or false. It should be
judged not in ‘truth space’ but in ‘consequence space.’ (3) Antifragility: It is required to have a benefit
when it is helpful larger than the loss when it is harmful. Thus it will eventually deliver gains from disorder.
(4) Robustness: It satisfies the fragility-based precautionary principle. (5) Opacity: You do not need to
understand how it works. (6) Survivability of populations: Such a heuristic should not be judged solely on
its intelligibility (how understandable it is), but on its survivability, or on a combination of intelligibility
and survivability. Thus a long-surviving heuristic is less fragile than a newly emerging one. But ultimately
it should never be assessed in its survival against other ideas, rather on the survival advantage it gave the
populations who used it.
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risk is not really in the visible past but rather in the future: the past is just a proxy.
The ‘recent past’ may not show these events and yet, typically, has higher weighting
in conventional time series analysis. Further, these silent risks, when they hit, are
produced most likely by some largely unknown class of distributions.
Using, for risk-management purposes, ‘fat tailed’ probability distributions
(those, such as power laws, that extrapolate beyond the sample set in which they
have been calibrated), also fails us because such distributions are extremely sen-
sitive to small changes in parameters.
In addition, consider the class of tail exposures that lead to ruin of a system,
whether the economy or the environment. Like a resource that gets depleted in
the long term, the risk of ruin makes the system unsustainable. If one incurs a tiny
probability of ruin as a ‘one-off’ risk, and survives it, and then continues to repeat
the exposure (simply because one has survived), one will eventually go bust. So
over time, and under repetition, a tiny risk ends up blowing up the system (Bar-
Yam, Read, and Taleb 2014).
Consider the recent crisis that started in 2008, resulting from the wild
accumulation of silent risk via a high ratio of debt and leverage in the system.
A good knowledge of history might have given people pause, as a similar rise of
the debt-to-GDP ratio occurred before the crisis of 1929, leading subsequently to
anti-debt sentiment. But the 1929 experience did not effectively cross generations.
Economic theories that Taleb has called “risk-blind” or “Black Swan-blind”
displaced the heuristic knowledge of grandmothers (2007; 2010b). The argument
made in Taleb (2007) is that debt accumulation reflects overconfidence. Under-
estimation of one’s error rate in forecasting the future leads to more debt, as it
makes the payoff under high leverage appear more attractive. In addition, such
overconfidence causes fragility in the system.
In the matter of debt, religions have been potent in the prevention of debt
accumulation: from the Ecclesiast, to Islam, to Aquinas (Summa, II-II, 78). Except
for Protestantism, every Abrahamic branch has had some interdict against ‘lending
with interest.’ The interdict’s justification invoked issues of moral symmetry be-
tween lender and borrower, but we believe that the actual causes for the survival of
such interdicts go beyond such a rationalization.
Compare the near-universal religious caution, even exhortation, against debt
to the Modigliani-Miller (1958) result establishing that a firm’s debt-equity ratio
does not matter for valuation, which invited an entire generation of economists to
endorse debt, or at least not caution against it. A careful reading of the literature
shows that the highly rationalistic approach of Modigliani and Miller ignores the
effect of debt on error in the representation of the future. And economists calling
this result a “theorem” when it is fragile to change of assumptions caused it to be
taken more seriously than was warranted.
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Religion counters the modern post-Enlightenment attitude as it allows us
to hold that what we don’t see or understand isn’t necessarily stupid or irrational.
In his technical book Silent Risk, Taleb (2014) argues that social science has
traditionally operated under the modus that what is not explainable is “irrational.”
Psychologists and behavioral economists often find that people do not appear
to follow a normative model, and then suggest that such behavior is “irrational”
or “biased.” But in talking that way, the analysts are usually missing layers of
uncertainty beyond that of a tinky-toy first-order model; it is the researcher who
is making a mistake, not the real-world person. Taleb (2014) shows that many
“biases” can be made to go away by building a richer mathematical model, one with
stochastic parameters. He also suggests that much of the decision-science literature
on ‘dread risk’ (whereby humans overestimate particular small-probability risks
and overreact to them) and ‘long-shot bias’ (overestimation by humans of the
odds of large-but-infrequent payoffs) turns out not to be robust to changes in
assumptions or environment, as the researchers have derived their conclusions
using thin-tailed models and experiments in thin-tailed domains. The role of small-
probability events is larger in fat-tailed domains, and once we take that into account
much of the so-called bias goes away. It looks instead like we humans
underestimate risks of unimagined rare events and overestimate our knowledge
about the future.
We believe that religion supplies potent tricks to mitigate people’s natural
epistemic arrogance and overconfidence about the future. “I don’t know” is
something hard for humans to accept and say; this is made easier in the Arabic
language, as the typical traditional expression is “God knows.” Saying “God
knows” is easier on one’s ego than “I don’t know.”
Wittgenstein (1961/1921, 6.372) remarked: “…the view of the ancients is
clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern
system tries to make it look as if everything were explained.”
Religion and beliefs
Let us now enlarge on an idea captured by an aphorism by Taleb (2010, 21):
“Restaurants get you in with food to sell you liquor; religions get you in with belief
to sell you rules (e.g., avoid debt). People can understand the notion of God, not
unexplained rules, interdicts, and categorical heuristics.”
When someone discusses religious beliefs, he does not necessarily mean belief
in the epistemic sense, and the relevance of the epistemic sense of the term de-
creases as we go back in the history of the fixation of the creed. For ancient Fertile
Crescent and Mediterranean pagan systems and what we commonly call
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Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Islam, and the various pre-Protestant Christian
branches), the notions of piste, πίστη in Greek, credere in Latin, or “Amen”/“Amin”
(ןומא and نيمآ) in Semitic languages do not map exactly to what we call “belief” in
today’s language. Rather, such notions are rather closer to the root of “belief”: be-
loved, a sense of commitment, something related to the notion of trust. It is not
coincidental that credere is related to letter of credit or financial transactions that
entail trust (see Armstrong 1994; Boyer 2001).
Accordingly it is an extremely naive interpretation to think that religious
‘beliefs’ map to the ‘justified true belief’ standards of modern epistemology (see
Ichikawa and Steup 2014); it is naive to examine the supernatural aspect of religion
as anything but epiphenomenal. One needs to think of religious ‘belief’ as closer
to a form of trusting, as a form of action, or a willingness to take action, and,
most crucially of all, as a set of interdicts upon action.5 Further, religion establishes
a categorical demarcation between sacred and profane, and one that cannot be
violated (see Eliade 1959). The sacred is not open to ‘rationalization’—what we
don’t understand is not necessarily irrational, and it might have reasons that can be
probed only across generations of experience and experimentation.
What we call religion itself conflates many ‘religions,’ as if they were variations
around the same system providing the same functions. To a Protestant in the
twenty-first century, religion has a large element of spirituality. But ancient
Mediterranean religion, including the three Abrahamic and other creeds, are about
heuristics, laws, and regulatory frameworks. In Arabic, “din” (نيد), which now
means “religion,” corresponds to “din” (ןיִד), “law” in Hebrew and ancient Arabic.
Medina, which means state in Hebrew and city in Arabic, means literally a place
where the law prevails. In addition, Islamic law was explicitly marketed as a sort of
risk management, counter to the great legal confusion towards the end of the sixth
century about the various commercial rules in the Arabic peninsula, with recourses
to makeshift arbiters (hakam) (see Schacht 1964).
Religion enforces interdicts.6 Interdicts appear to be historically the most
potent form of regulation, considerably better than moderation. Jon Elster (2007,
ch. 13) writes about how abstinence is more effective than rationing or “moder-
ation.”
Consider the evolution of ideas: ‘bad ideas’ (in the epistemic sense) can
survive if they have some side benefits—an idea that seems to be absent in the
literature about “evolutionary epistemology” (Popper 1999). It is misguided to
5. Such an understanding of belief is encountered in the philosophy of religion, e.g., by R. W. Hepburn
(1958). It is present in the works of Kierkegaard and William James, and especially subtly in Wittgenstein's
writings. Wittgenstein offers a reading of what religion in its true sense is. He offers a way of understanding
how religion can be possible and necessary without its descending into outright superstition.
6. See Fourest and Venner (2010) for a list of interdicts across various creeds.
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focus on the competition between ideas—and their survival—as an end product.
What matters is the survival of the populations that have such ideas. Those with
the right risk-management heuristics make it, even if their system of belief does not
appear ‘rational.’
Conclusion
It is not just that religion is a helpful source of sound heuristics for resisting
gambler’s ruin and similar hazards. More strongly, we should say that we humans
actually don’t know whether human beings can live sustainably without something
like religion. Modernity is in this sense a dangerous uncontrolled experiment. The
amount of historical time that any significant number of humans have lived without
religion is infinitesimal compared to the sweep of history. Given that, the amount
of time that we have sought as societies, as a species, to live without religion is
almost nil. It is a symptom of chronic short-termism and over-optimism that
people now assume that living in such a way is sustainable.
Just as nature is ‘wiser’ than us (in a statistical, risk-management sense) with
regard to a vast swathe of threats, illnesses, etc., just as our knowledge only sur-
passes nature’s in unusual and rare circumstances, so religious man is wiser than
irreligious and non-religious man with regard to a vast swathe of threats, moral and
spiritual illnesses and problems, etc. The knowledge of irreligious and non-religious
man surpasses that of religious man only in rare and unusual circumstances. Until
we have had a lot longer to develop non-religious heuristics that work, we should
not throw the precautionary, religion-as-risk-management baby out with the
superstitious, theological-claptrap bathwater.
The idea advanced here, about the role of religion for system-risk manage-
ment, has been aired in a manner to provoke attention and interest; we advocate
more research about interdicts that are helpful in risk management and about the
viable modes, religious or otherwise, of carrying those interdicts.
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